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The Meaning of 
By Gayle MacDonald 
Le prbent article offre un expose' sur Ia 
signification du mot N e'quite' dans le 
cadre des dispositions sur l'tgalite' 
contenues dans la Charte des droits et 
liberte's. Les interprttations le'gales du 
mot << tfgalith, en terrnesde similitude, de 
difkrence et d'avantage, sont analystes 
duns une perspective fgm'niste qui utilise 
le syst2me judiciaire en (ant qu'instrument 
d'tvolution sociale. 
The meaning of equity is fundamen- 
tally, I believe, about rights. The idea of 
equality on whichemploymentequity and 
pay equity rests, is about treating people 
without discrimination. The right to be 
treated without discrimination is en- 
trenched in our Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, section 15. That section claims 
that people should not be discriminated 
against before and under the law on the 
basis of age, race, sex, religious or ethnic 
origin, physical or mental ability. I would 
agree, as some recent legal cases have 
indicated, that discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation and marital status 
are arguably similar enough to the desig- 
nated grounds under section 15, to be 
included in this list. Further, affirmative 
action programmes are protected under 
subsection 2 of this provision. 
The reason I highlight Charter equality 
guarantees is that these provisions are 
legally enforceable in the public realm, 
and for many of us, section 15 represented 
a true beacon of hope in the search for 
equality for all within Canadian social 
structure. But despite the claim of those 
detractors of employment equity legisla- 
tion (most often employers, rather than 
'stakeholders" ) who state that 'equity 
legislation is not necessary, it is covered 
by other legislation' or that 'employment 
equity is about the needs of whi te women' 
and therefore can be dismissed, readers 
need only be reminded that despite sec- 
tion 15, and some would argue as a result 
of it, there has been an unprecedented 
backlash to the concerns and the needs of 
the disadvantaged in Canada. This back- 
lash has taken many forms, political cor- 
rectness is but one. What I mean by back- 
lash is what William Ryan refers to as 
"blaming the victim." 
For example, if a recession hits, then 
those hardest hit by economic downturns, 
the disabled, white women, aboriginal 
women, women of colour, lesbians, sin- 
gle parents and immigrants are blamed for 
monetary restrictions which have very 
little to do with them. We are, as the 
saying goes, "the last hired and the first 
fixed" when economic times get tough. 
Feminists need to examine ideas around 
equity to determine how to combat these 
practises. Many articles in this journal 
issue point to strategies on a variety of 
fronts within "the m~vement. '~ 
The focus of this discussion, however, 
will primarily look towards definitions of 
equality in law, where discussions around 
equity now (since the 1985 proclamation 
of section 15) primarily involve Charter 
equality rights. Hopefully, thereader will 
be able to trace where we have "come 
from" in ideas around equity, with some 
idea, perhaps, of where we are "going." 
The Definition of Equality 
Recent writings by lawyers, sociolo- 
gists and professors of jurisprudence who 
are concerned with the impact of equality 
decisions on women's lives include Eberts 
(1985 and 1990), Miles (1985) and 
MacKinnon (1982 and 1987). Eberts' 
concern is that a guarantee of equality 
rights in law should not be treated by 
women as an implicit understanding by 
the judiciary or the legal system of the 
concept of equality. In other words, legis- 
lating a legal equality guarantee may nei- 
ther ensure equality for women, nor may 
it ensure a definition of equality accept- 
able to women. Eberts argues for a broad 
interpretation of equality in law by the 
judiciary to ensureequality ofresult. Miles 
claims that the concept of equality appre- 
ciated by the courts is based on an explicit 
acceptance of the male norm and she 
Equity 
advocates a rethinking of the concept of 
equality in law altogether. Her premise 
raises an interesting dilemma. How does 
one resolve the inherent inconsistency 
that may exist by claiming any concept of 
equality norm? For example, the Aristote- 
lian notion of absolute equality, that is, 
equality defined as "sameness," has 
dominated legal thinking. The problem 
with this concept is that it may not repre- 
sent the lived experience of women. I 
define "lived experience" in a similar 
fashion to Dorothy Smith (1987), as the 
reality of women's lives, a reality which 
often stands in contrast to patriarchal as- 
sumptions, theories and hopes for wom- 
en's lives. 
Basically, an equality of "sameness" 
purports that women and men are to be 
treated equally [read the same] regardless 
of whether women and men have been 
treated the same up to the point at which 
the equality standard is applied. No con- 
sideration is given to the possibility that 
treating people "the same" may yield un- 
equal outcomes in a context of systemic 
inequality? 
It could initially appearthat being treated 
equally or the same is the goal of equality 
seekers: and has been so for a long time. 
An example of this is the women's move- 
ment's struggle for employment equity 
(Abella, 1984). But context is critical for 
any definition. If the conditions of wom- 
en's work are such that the "same" work 
done by women and men is treated differ- 
entially in pay rates, then clearly, the two 
groups are not treated "eq~ally."~ But 
would an absolute standard of equality 
such as this work in all conditions? The 
answer is definitely not. For a rationale of 
absolute equality ignores the lived experi- 
ence of some people's lives. For example, 
in circumstances where women's and 
men'sresponsibilities differ significantly, 
women, as a direct result, simply do not 
have the same opportunities as do men in 
specific public, economic or political are- 
nas. An absolute standard of equality 
would do little more than reinforce the 
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belief that equity somehow exists in the 
reality of women's lives. 
The illusion that women have achieved 
equality is almost as pervasive as the 
reality of oppression (Brodsky and Day, 
1989: 11). 
Men and women are not equal, not in 
socio-economic status (Mies, 1986), not 
in wage scales (McDermott, 1991), not in 
career opportunity nor advancement 
(Armstrong and Armstrong, 1983; Pask 
et al., 1985) and certainly not in the home 
(Delphy, 1984;Luxton, 1- 
that there are some situations in which the 
sexes should be treated differently, advo- 
cates of this position are reclaiming ma- 
ternity leave for mothers and exploring 
support systems for women breast-feed- 
ing at work. 
It could also be argued, however, that 
giving women "special status" in law re- 
affirms prevailing notions that women 
need protectionist policies in order to 
function in the 'public' world of men. In 
these instances, advocates claim that a 
'sex-neutral gender-specific' concept of 
equality could fill the desire for sameness, 
upcoming season. All members of a team 
are subject to the regulations of the On- 
tario Hockey Association. Justine was 
denied on the basis that if she wanted to 
play hockey, she should play with the 
women's league. That league chd not af- 
ford the challenge that her athletic ability 
required. Blainey filed a complaint with 
the Ontario Human Rights Commission 
that the Ontario Hockey Association's 
ruling was discriminatory. The case even- 
tually reached the courts, which found in 
her favour. She was 12 years old when the 
proceedings began, but by the time legal 
-1 proceedings were 
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1980; Luxton and 
Rosenberg, 1986). 
To treat "equals 
equally and unequals 
unequally," in the Ar- 
istotelian sense is nei- 
ther accurate nor use- 
ful. It simply reinforces 
the type of judgment 
found in Bliss. Stella 
Bliss was fired from her 
job because she was 
pregnant and found she 
was ineligible to col- 
lect either unemploy- 
ment insurance ben- 
efits (due to her preg- 
nancy) or pregnancy 
benefits (because she 
was unemployed). In 
this case, the court re- 
fused to invalidate a 
sector of the Unem- 
ployment Insurance 
Act which set out dif- 
ferent rules for eligi- 
bility to unemployment insurance for and the need for differences when appro- impacts on women in cases of incest. 
women who had just given birth toachild. priate. For example, the situation cited Often a women reaches at least the age of 
Judicial reasoning such as this formed the above regarding maternity leave couldbe majority before she can report the crime. 
basis for the inclusion of thephrase"every argued simultaneously with a policy on A charge of sexual assault, however, if 
individu al... has the right to the equal parenting leave forboth sexes. This would proceeded with as a summary conviction 
protection of the law and to equal benefits be consistent with the 'sex-neutral gen- offence, needs to be filed in a period of six 
under the law" in section 15 (Atcheson et der-specific' position, protecting women months after the alleged assault (C.C.Cs. 
al., 1984).6Clearly, Bliss was denied ben- when necessary, and allowing both sexes 785). If the victim wishes to obtain dam- 
efits under the law. The decision in this to fully participate in responsibilities that ages in a civil lawsuit, she must bring her 
case wouldcontravenetheequality provi- should be shared. To state equality as a action within two years of the assault. If 
sion as it now reads in the Charter of fundamental principle of law, however, the incest was a single act, and if the 
Rights and Freedoms. does not guarantee equality of result, as woman was a very young child when the 
Some initial suggestions that take us the Blainey case would illustrate. act occurred or if she only recovers the 
beyondthe 'absoluteequality' frame-work Justine Blainey is a young woman who memory after years of therapy, it is rea- 
look to a 'sex-specific' theory of equality. wanted to play hockey on a boy 'S team in sonable to assume that neither six months 
Essentially the sex-specific concept of September, 1985. She had practised with (the limitation period on a summary con- 
equality offers a way out of the rigidity of the team for a year, and she and the team's viction), nor two years (the limitation 
the absolute equality theory. By stating coach agreed she should play in the period on a civil suit) may reflect the 
( 
mcuu 
terminated, she was 
too old to play in the 
league. Although she 
eventually won, the 
.=: result of the case did S 
.- 3 littleby the timeitwas 
rendered. 
3 Other principles in 
m 
.a, law have the same ef- b S fect. For example, the 
F "statute of limita- 2 
tions" in law applies 
to the time period 
S g within which legal 
* 
2 proceedings may be 
3 .S 3 g, taken. Admittedly, 
Q such a principle pre- 5 9: vents miscarriage of 
2 g procedural justice; 
g that is, there is alimit 
I 2 to how long after an ;-0 incident one has to 
live with the threat of 2 5 a law suit or criminal 
2 3 prosecution. But this 
principle unevenly 
reality of most women's e~perience.~ As
Golding states: "there is little point in 
devising standards or rules of fair pme-  
dure unless following them results in just 
decisions or outcomes" (Golding, 
1975: 120). 
The case of Schacter is yet another 
example where a legislative guarantee 
may not always result in just outcomes. 
Mr. Schacter argued that biological and 
adoptive fathers who want to share the 
responsibilities of child-rearing should 
receive the same benefits under the law as 
do biological mothers. The difficulty in 
this case was not his objective, but the 
arguments by which he hoped to achieve 
his objective. He was arguing that bio- 
logical fathers should get a share of bio- 
logical mother's maternity leave benefits. 
This argument greatly endangers hard- 
won maternity benefits for women in law. 
To achieve his objective, the argument 
would be more accurately an argument 
for increased parenting leave, rather than 
one for decreased maternity leave. Al- 
though Justice Strayer of the Trial Divi- 
sion of the Federal Court accepted the 
intervenor'ss arguments and extended 
parental benefits for both parents while 
protecting maternity leave, it still leaves 
open the possibility that his decision can 
be challenged at a later date; in fact, the 
federal government is appealing the Fed- 
eral Court decision. 
It appears that the focus for a researcher 
interested in examining what equality ac- 
tually means in Canadian law needs to 
look beyond definitions of equality in 
law, beyond the fact that equality is a 
legislated guarantee, in order to deter- 
mine on what basis decisions and argu- 
ments around the concept of equality are 
made. 
These argumentsconcerning definitions 
of equality tend to obfuscate a critical 
point for feminist work, however. Argu- 
ments that are concerned with which defi- 
nitions of equality are to be utilized effec- 
tively in a court of law do not point up the 
inherent contradiction of using any con- 
cept of equality fixed in a liberal demo- 
cratic/male dominated tradition. Equal- 
ity, by definition, comes from a liberal 
humanisttradition whichbegins with Jean- 
Jacques Rousseau and ends up in the 
legislation of aliberal democratic state, of 
which the Charter ofRightsand Freedoms 
is part. The inconsistency resurfaces; that 
is, do the study of equality rights which 
are framed in patriarchal discourse de- drycleaning clothes, or packing groceries 
serve the study and attention of feminist 
and who are simply tm busy putting food 
scholars wanting to advance the positions 
of women in society by using law as a on the table to have the leisure to "write" 
about equity? In what legislation can I 
mechanism of social change? Can law be find guarantees for those women that their 
usedatall? Judy Fudge(l99l) is skeptical. jobs will be secure tomorrow, that they She claims: 
will not be surreptitiously slipped into 
The problem with an approach that 
requires us to litigate our way to gender 
neutrality is that litigation favours a 
few at the expense of the many. Only 
large, wellfinanced, women-dominated 
unions can fiord, both politically and 
economically, to litigate. (75) 
Despite the dangers of litigating equal- 
ity, organizations such as the Women's 
Legal Education and Ac tion Fund (LEAF) 
have taken cases on equality rights since 
1985. Indeed, the issue may have now 
become whether or not to put all the 
proverbial "eggs" in the litigation basket. 
As recently as February, 1992, key strat- 
egists within LEAF, such as Mary Eberts, 
were publically stating that political ac- 
tion is as necessary to feminist advances 
around equality as is litigation? 
In order to assess the utility of legisla- 
tion, however, feminist researchers need 
to analyse, expand and influence defini- 
tions of equality in law. For if the terms on 
which equality rights are based are not 
contested by feminists, then the theory 
and vision of the "results" of a legal equal- 
ity rights challenge may look very similar 
to every other liberal democratic process. 
Simply put, neither the guarantee of 
equality rights in law nor debates over 
which definition of equality is most effec- 
tive in court will ensure that equality 
rights in practise resemble the intent of 
said equality rights as legislated. 
To analyze the concept of equality, 
then, feminists need to address not only 
the intent of law, but the process of work- 
ing through law to formulate socialchange. 
Any analysis which does not reveal this 
process denies the experiences of those 
who are actively engaged in the struggle 
for equality. To deny the voices of women 
is, I would argue, akin to denying the very 
struggle upon which definitions of equal- 
ity are based. Such denial ultimately begs 
the question. Where are all of those 
women, those sisters of mine, who are not 
writing about equity today because they 
are cleaning houses, or scrubbing toilets 
or looking after someone else's children, 
"casual" categories, or temporary con- 
tracts simply because they may have, in 
the best case scenario, asked to be pro- 
moted, or in the worst case scenario, tried 
to start a union? 
Those who do this work, as well as 
those who act on behalf of clients, those 
who struggle for equity in the workplace, 
those who are underpaid and exploited, 
are engaged in the process of formulating 
equality praxis in this country.'O However, 
the process of the shaping of law and what 
equality looks like on an everyday level 
must not be lost to legal and academic 
arguments based on results. The manner 
by which feminists reach towards equal- 
ity is just as critical as the point when we 
have reached it. If this were not the case, 
the ontology of feminist struggle would 
be a temporal one. We would define the 
effectiveness of feminist work only by 
outcomes, when we readily acknowledge 
that much of the important work of femi- 
nism occurs in the process of reaching 
towards result, those points at which 
women realize their feminism." We need 
to be attentive to our struggle as much as 
we are attentive to the outcome of strug- 
gle. That attentiveness needs to be turned 
to the process of the guarantee of equality, 
the struggles around formulation, defini- 
tion and argument that lie in the words of 
those who perform those tasks daily. 
Hence, we need a systematic analysis 
of equality rights to determine the contri- 
butions of traditional philosophical rea- 
soning in the formation of a definition of 
equality, as well as the contributions to 
equality theory that schools of thought 
specifically interested in the ability of law 
to affect social change-which means the 
contributions of the feminist movement. 
Future Directions 
Recent, alternative definitions around 
equity in law are primarily practised, at 
the time of this writing, by the Women's 
Legal Education and Action Fund. Theo- 
ries around equality have moved and 
shifted from the "sameness/difference" 
debates to concepts that capture the idea 
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of "disad~antage."'~ What this shift does 
is to capture the nature of women's reality 
in the courtroom. Women are not "equal" 
to men at the door of the courtroom; 
women are not even equal to each other. It 
was clear to feminist litigants that a defi- 
nition to capture this idea, to build on the 
critical Andrews decision (which effec- 
tively erased the need to "similarly situ- 
ate" groups to each other to prove dis- 
crimination, and which was detrimental 
to arguing women's inequality without a 
comparison group), to illustrate women's 
inequity as it exists, rather than as it ap- 
pears, was critical. Theconcept of "disad- 
vantage" is used by LEAF to capture the 
idea that women, due to differences based 
on sex, as well as differences based on 
class, race and ethnic origin, age, sexual 
orientation and physical or mental ability, 
differ not only from men, but from each 
other; and that these differences may 
largely disadvantage women within legal 
definitions that are based on male privi- 
lege. 
This departure is a critical point in the 
utility of legislative ends to meet feminist 
concerns. For a concept such as "disad- 
vantage" to be used in legal circles, while 
not entirely new, is relatively novel in 
terms of work around the specific situa- 
tions encountered by women in equality 
cases. To argue that women'sdiscrimina- 
tion exists in its own right, and not in 
opposition to standards set by men 
(MacKinnon, 1989) is new. But this dis- 
cussion around which definition in law 
obfuscates another, is a critical point. 
Have feminists decided, in the end, to 
use the legal arena to affect change? One 
could argue that given the recent interest 
by women's groups in the Employment 
Equity Consultation Hearings of the NDP 
government in Ontario that there is some 
agreement on this point.* 
One thing is clear. Judging from the 
response" to the Hearings, it is safe to say 
that most groups concerned with equity 
agree that legislated employment equity 
is an absolute necessity. Without legis- 
lation, without mandatory reporting on 
the part of both the private and public 
sector, without clearly defined scales that 
take into account gender divisions of spe- 
cific groups (aboriginals as a category is 
not enough, for example), without man- 
datory goals and timetables set for the 
achievement of  equity, informal rules will 
become the order of the day. 
The problem with informality is that it 
has never protected the disadvantaged 
(Williams, 1991). Formal rules and pro- 
cedures, clearly defined categories that 
have some relationship to reality, such as 
concepts that get at why so called "tar- 
geted" groups are leaving employment, or 
disability defined as more than wearing 
glasses, end up making equity possible in 
recessionary times. 
The possibility of equity in a recession 
is a point which any systemic analysis of 
equality rights reveals, and it is an argu- 
ment that needs to be made on the basis of 
the price paid when issues of equity are 
ignored. The idea that equity "costs" is, in 
my mind, a ridiculous idea. Let me make 
that point another way. Inequity costs. 
Unequal opportunities in the job market, 
deceptive categories and job descriptions 
which cover gross inequities in wage dis- 
parities, forced termination of work, all 
represent increased costs to employers, 
governments and people. The economic 
costs of not advancing employees, of de- 
nying wages on the basis of highly spuri- 
ous categories andreasoning,costs money 
to employers, insurance companies and 
the state in terms of worker health, emo- 
tional stability, productivity and effi- 
cienc y . 
It is a productive, stable, healthy, ad- 
equately payinglpromoting and hu-mane 
work environs, free from sexual harass- 
ment, to which equity work is dedicated. 
The right for any woman to work, to live 
and to grow in such a space, is ultimately, 
the true meaning of equity. 
* See  the excerpts of briefs presented to 
theEmployment Equity Commissioner in 
this issue. 
'National Action Committee Brief to the 
Ontario Employment Equity Consul- 
tations, January, 1992. 
I use quotations here to inlcate my 
skepticism around this term. The idea the 
there is but one "movement" within femi- 
nist work has effectively denied the con- 
tributions of many women who do not 
actually "write" about feminism or "do" 
activist work. It is critical that feminist 
researchers (I include myself in this cat- 
egory) keep this in mind. 
Theconcept of "sarneness,"as it evolves 
in jurisprudence, appears under various 
guises in the literature. It has been re- 
ferred to as "absolute equality" (Charter 
of Rights Education Fund, 1985), and as 
"formal equality" (Greene, 1989). This 
contrasts with the attempts to categorize 
"equality before the law" as refemng to 
only procedural guarantees of equality 
(Brodsky and Day, 1989:14) or "facial 
discrimination" (on the face of the law 
only) (Canadian Advisory Council on the 
Status of Women, 1985) andUsubstantive 
equality" or equality of results meaning 
the intent or actual equality interpretation 
necessary for section 15 (Women's Legal 
Education and Action Fund, 1986). 
S e e  Razack, 1991 for a historical discus- 
sion of the development of the phrase 
"equality seekers" (49). 
See the LEAF publication Litigation 
Works 1987 for a more complete discus- 
sion on how employment law affects 
equality legal cases. 
See Brodsky and Day, One Step For- 
ward: Two Steps Back, Canadian Advi- 
sory Council on the Status of Women, 
Ottawa: 1989,ll- 17 for a more complete 
argument on the inclusion of the phrases 
"before and under the law" "equal benefit 
and protection" of the law in the wording 
of section 15. 
' LEAF is involved in a Charter challenge 
based on that very premise. LEAF has 
agreed in principle to assist two B.C. 
women who are challenging the two-year 
limitation period 'for filing civil suits for 
damages in cases of sexual assault ... 
LEAF says that the two-year limitation 
period for bringing civil action for dam- 
ages for sexual assault in childhood does 
not take into account the profound physi- 
cal and psychological injury caused by 
such assault (Leaf Lines, 3.2, February, 
1990:4). 
The intervenor I refer to here is the 
Women's Legal Education and Action 
Fund. 
9These were commentsreleased by media 
coverage of a LEAF conference held in 
Ottawa, February 12-15,1992. 
" Ann Oakley, Taking It Like a Woman 
London: Flamingo, Fontana Paperbacks, 
1985. For a more complete analysis of the 
importance of consciousness raising as 
method, see Catherine MacKinnon, 
Feminism Unmodified 1987a. 
IZ The use of the "disadvantage" concept 
may have ontological problems all its 
own. There are claims that this concept 
has existed in human rights legislation for 
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years, and perhaps the concept is being 
appropriated by white feminists. Further, 
some who are not entirely comfortable 
with the idea of having their discrimina- 
tion described in terms of their own inher- 
ent "disadvantage." (From a conversation 
with the national Public Education Com- 
mittee of LEAF, August, 199 1). 
l 3  AS reported in The Kingston Whig 
Standard "Excerpts from hearings on 
Employment Equity," February 7, 1992. 
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